No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery? by Herbert, William  A.
1No Direction Home: Will The Law Keep Pace With Human Tracking Technology to 
Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?  
 
William A. Herbert
Abstract 
The scope and nature of current legal principles regarding individual privacy are 
not sufficient to respond to the rapid development and use of human tracking technology.  
The academic use of the phrase “geoslavery” to describe the abusive use of such 
technology underscores the power of the new technology.  This article examines the use 
of such technology under current federal and state law and suggests potential means for 
developing greater legal protections against the abusive use of the technology and the 
intrusion into personal privacy. 
The primary legal source for protections against governmental intrusion into an 
individual’s privacy stem from various federal and state constitutional provisions 
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts have determined that most 
technologically based human location tracking outside the home is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment restrictions because it does not violate an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  In contrast, some analogous state constitutional provisions have 
been held to require a warrant prior to the police utilizing human tracking technology. 
The growing proliferation and use of human tracking technology implicates legal 
issues under the Thirteenth Amendment. Control and restriction of another individual’s 
location constitutes one of the vestiges and incidents of slavery. The use of mandatory or 
voluntary human tracking implants may be the subject to future federal legislative 
prohibition or restrictions under the remedial provision of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Various federal and state laws have been proposed and enacted to place 
restrictions on both governmental and private use of human tracking technology.  In 
addition, the use of such technology has been subject to challenge under a common law 
right to privacy.  Increasingly, public and private employers are utilizing human tracking 
devices to monitor employee movement and conduct. Due to the propensity of American 
labor law to give greater weight to employer property interests over most employee 
privacy expectations, there are few current limitations on the use of human tracking in 
employment.  
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Introduction 
 
The creation and increased use of various forms of human tracking technology by 
governmental entities, private entities and individuals raise profound policy and legal 
issues for our society.  The scope of constitutional, legislative or administrative 
limitations on the use of such technology reflects on our society’s concepts of freedom, 
individual autonomy and protected privacy.  As technology advances, it expands the 
means for privacy intrusions thereby limiting the personal secrets and confidences that 
can be concealed. The growing availability and use of human tracking technology 
diminishes privacy interests that may precipitate societal demands for increased legal 
protections. 
 
How freedom and privacy are defined today has substantive consequences in the 
legal measures that will be devised and applied to protect those interests. As Columbia 
University historian Eric Foner has shown, the concept and boundaries of freedom have 
changed over the course of American history.  Throughout our history, the definition of 
freedom has been constantly redefined but has always been subject to a balance between 
individual rights and property rights, as well as, a balance between the right of the 
individual and the power of the state.1 Similar balances are applicable in how the 
contours of protected individual privacy are defined. 
 
In order to respond to the power of contemporary human tracking, a new societal 
consensus needs to be reached regarding what constitutes privacy and how it can be 
protected. At the same time, a judgment must be reached whether the legal standards 
applicable to government surveillance under the Constitution should be the same for non-
governmental surveillance.  
 
In contemporary American culture, some view the concept of freedom as being 
manifested in consumerism with the ubiquitous cell phone as a primary symbol. It is 
 
1 Foner, The Story of American Freedom (Norton 1998). 
3doubtful that most cell phone users are aware that the same technology that grants them 
this sense of consumer freedom also results in wireless companies receiving automatic 
and continuous updates regarding their location. Physical possession of a cell phone 
renders an individual vulnerable to location surveillance by government entities. When an 
employer distributes a cell phone for use by an employee, the employee’s location 
becomes subject to location monitoring by the employer on and off the job. A third party 
who obtains physical access to another person’s cell phone can easily transform it into a 
stalking device by registering it with an internet location based services.2 Mass 
recognition of this non-negotiated trade of a cellular sense of freedom for perpetual 
surveillance may constitute an Achilles heel to the currently unregulated location based 
tracking marketplace. 
 
Unlike the debates connected with bioethics and stem cell research, the legal and 
ethical issues connected with human tracking technology have not been subjected to a 
serious and rigorous debate. Whether our society is prepared to collectively accept 
narrow notions of privacy and autonomy through electronic location devices remains to a 
large extent unexplored. Recent media disclosures of unchecked and probable unlawful 
use of presidential authority to engage in warrantless technologically based surveillance 
of Americans may spur a more reasoned and spirited societal discussion regarding the 
impact of new technology on personal privacy.3 Such disclosures may render unuseful the 
political cliché  “9/11 changed everything” as justification for the erosion of protected 
privacy interests and other civil liberties.4 It remains to be seen whether the discussion 
regarding unchecked presidential power will extend to a broader questioning of electronic 
surveillance.  
 
This article will discuss various legal principles and issues associated with human 
tracking technology in both the public and private sectors.  In addition, it will aim to 
suggest potential solutions aimed at creating a balance between liberty and security as 
they relate to the utilization of human tracking devices.  The application of such 
principles and the nature of the solutions will depend on the type of tracking device and 
the context in which the device is utilized. For example, the legal rules applicable to 
mandatory or voluntary human implants containing location technology should be far 
more restrictive than limitations that may be placed on an employer utilizing a location 
device to track an employee driving an employer owned vehicle with a GPS installation 
during working hours.  
 
2 Goldacre, How I Stalked My Girlfriend, Guardian, February 1, 2006. 
3Risen and Licthblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, New York Times, December 16, 
2005, p. A1; Licthblau and Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, New York Times, 
December 24, 2005; Wald, Widespread Radioactivity Monitoring Is Confirmed, December 24, 2005. 
4 Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom In An Anxious Age (2004) pp.55-61 
Among the many questionable uses of the September 11, 2001 tragedy as a rationale for policy changes 
was the 2004 National Labor Relations Board’s decision that cited 9/11 as justification for overturning 
prior precedent that had recognized a statutory right of a private sector employee in an unorganized 
worksite to be represented by a co-worker during a disciplinary interrogation. IBM Corp., 341 NLRB No. 
148 (2004).   
4Currently, the contours of protected privacy remain closely linked to property 
rights. As will be seen, constitutional protections against technological invasions into 
privacy remain strongest inside one’s home or apartment with the windows shuttered. 
Once an individual leaves his or her home or is visible inside the home from public 
space, there is a precipitous drop in the scope of legal protections.  
 
In contrast, many of us still retain a subjective sense of spatial autonomy even 
though within the eyeshot of the public eye. The concept that one can get lost in a crowd 
and retain a protected zone of privacy and autonomy currently lacks strong legal 
foundation. Historically, escape to urban areas constituted a means of obtaining 
anonymity and a new identity.5 The growing availability of human tracking technology 
has the probability of eviscerating any subjective sense of personal autonomy while 
outside the home unless there is corrective legislative action. 
 
This article will discuss various legal principles and issues associated with human 
tracking technology in both the public and private sectors.  In addition, it will aim to 
suggest potential legal solutions aimed at creating a balanced approach between liberty 
and security as they relate to human tracking technology.  The application of such 
principles and the nature of the solutions will depend on the type of tracking device and 
the context in which the device is utilized. Concerns relating to privacy and autonomy are 
greatest when global positioning system (hereinafter “GPS”)6, radio frequency 
identification (hereinafter “RFID”)7 and cellular technology8 are utilized by the 
government to conduct surveillance, employers to monitor employees, school districts to 
 
5Franklin and Schweninger, Runaway Slaves, pp.123-148 (Oxford University Press 1999).   
6 GPS is a satellite based electronic system that provides very precise tracking of objects, individuals and 
other animals in real time anywhere on the planet. Originally developed by the military, GPS technology 
has been available for civilian use for over twenty years.  Through triangulation of information from 
satellite signals, a GPS receiver can determine the speed, latitude and longitude of an object or individual 
under surveillance. GPS receivers can be attached or installed in objects such vehicles, cell phones and 
laptops.  In addition, GPS receivers can be carried by, attached to or implanted in an individual. See, 
Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s 
Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C.L. Rev. 661, 665-666 (2005); 
Edmundson, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer Privacy Be Lost In Order for People to 
be Found?, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 207, 209-210 (2005).  
7 RFID is a radio based identification system that utilizes tags with computer chips containing digital 
information that can be used to track and identify humans, animals and inanimate objects. The digital 
information contained in the microchip can be read through the use of an RFID reader. There are two types 
of RFID tags.  An active RFID tag is battery powered and emits a regular signal.  In contrast, a passive 
RFID tag is powered only when in contact with a reader. See, Hostetter, When Small Technology is a Big 
Deal: Legal Issues Arising from Business Use of RFID, 2 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 10 (Dec. 16, 2005), at 
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a010Hostetter.html. Common uses of RFID technology  
include merchandise inventory control, airline luggage location and electronic tolling systems.  
8 There are two different aspects of human tracking technology connected with the cellular marketplace.  
Following issuance of E-911 rules by the Federal Communications Commission in 1997, many cellular 
companies installed GPS chips in their cell phones.  In addition, the location of a powered on cell phone 
can be tracked in real time through the constant and automatic communication between the cell phone and 
cell towers. Krim, FBI Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, Washington Post, October 28, 2005; 
Richtel, Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights On Privacy, New York Times, December 
10, 2005. 
 
5track their students, rental car companies to monitor the use of rented vehicles and 
parents to keep track of their elusive teenagers.   
 
Important legal and policy issues also arise in the context of individual volitional 
use of tracking technology for safety and convenience. The utilization of new 
technological gadgets can result in unwanted or unanticipated third party surveillance and 
unforeseen negative consequences such as stalking. Although many motorists enjoy the 
efficiency of electronic tollbooths and “smart highways” such enjoyment may abruptly 
end if or when the government begins to issue speeding tickets premised on the electronic 
information that calculates the average speed of a trip between two electronic points.9 The 
federal government is currently funding state studies regarding the use of GPS tracking 
on toll roads to develop “mileage-based user fees.”10 Similarly, market location devices 
and services do not constitute “magic bullets” that resolve parental fears. Equipment 
failure or malfunction in such devices and services can increase anxiety, if not panic, for 
a parent who chooses tracking technology over direct supervision of a child.   
 
The legal implications relating to an individual’s volitional use of a tracking 
device to monitor his or her own whereabouts or for safety while driving, hiking or 
boating will not be the subject of this article. Reasonable people can differ whether 
individual use of such technological devices lead to personal serenity or are necessitated 
by genuine risks to personal safety.11 There are few justifications for expansive regulation 
of an individual’s choice to utilize new technological gadgets unless the technology 
results in unwanted or unanticipated third party surveillance, leads to an increase in 
reckless and anti-social behavior or is used to intrude on the privacy of others. Tracking 
devices, like other technological developments, can lead to unforeseen negative social 
consequences.12 
I.   Constitutional Limitations On The Use of Human Tracking Technology 
 
The primary source for current American legal analysis of protected privacy 
interests stems from the field of constitutionally mandated criminal procedure based on 
judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 At 
 
9 Caldwell, A Pass On Privacy? New York Times Magazine, July 17, 2005, pp. 13-14. 
10 McCullagh, E-tracking, coming to a DMV near you, CnetNews.com, December 5, 2005. In New York, 
over 200 volunteer drivers participated in a federally funded study utilizing GPS devices to create a data 
flow regarding traffic patterns and speeds in a 40-mile radius. Hill, Traffic Studied Using Computer-Linked 
Cars, Associated Press, April 24, 2005. 
11For example, author Ted Conover has noted that use of a vehicle GPS device can deprive enjoyment “of 
unmeasured moments of suspension between here and there.” Conover, Get Lost, New York Times, 
December 14, 2005. 
12 The great television comic Sid Caesar has observed that the use of television remote control devices has 
led to negative social consequences: “The remote control took over the timing of the world.  That’s why 
you have road rage. You have people who have no patience, because you get immediate gratification. You 
go click, click, click, click.  If it doesn’t explode within three seconds, click, click, click.” Boedeker, PBS’ 
Pioneers’ is a history lesson, Chicago Tribune, August 8, 2005. 
13 The Fourth Amendment provides that: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
6present, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to most recent forms of human tracking technology. Based on precedent 
over the past four decades regarding the scope of privacy protections under the Fourth 
Amendment, any expectation for broad judicially based limitations on human tracking 
technology would be illusory.  
 
The tendency of certain justices and judges to apply judicial restraint with respect 
to constitutional criminal procedure should not be confused with indifference to the 
impact technology is having on privacy.  Five years ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, expressed deep concerns regarding the decline in privacy 
in the modern technological world: 
Technology now permits millions of important and confidential conversations to 
occur through a vast system of electronic networks. These advances, however, 
raise significant privacy concerns. We are placed in the uncomfortable position of 
not knowing who might have access to our personal and business e-mails, our 
medical and financial records, or our cordless and cellular telephone 
conversations.14 
Despite such pronouncements, it is unlikely that workable limitations on the use 
of human tracking devices will grow out of criminal appeals under the Fourth 
Amendment. In addition, it is unlikely that in present political climate Congress will 
increase federal restrictions on tracking technology based on contemporary deregulation 
ideology and the politics of fear.  It is far more probable that broader restrictions will 
come from state legislative initiatives and judicial interpretations of state constitutional 
provisions, statutes and common law. 
 
A.   Human Tracking and the Fourth Amendment 
 
In 1928, fifty years following the invention of the telephone by Alexander 
Graham Bell, in Olmstead v. United States15, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit federal Prohibition officials from 
eavesdropping on telephone conversations taking place in the defendants’ homes and 
offices by inserting small wires on eight telephone lines outside those premises. The 
Olmstead majority reasoned that because the federal agents had placed the wiretaps on 
the outside they had not engaged in a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
requiring the issuance of a warrant: “The intervening wires are not part of his house or 
office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”16 Therefore, the 
 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
14 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, dissenting). In that same year, Justice Scalia 
observed that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 33-34 (2001). 
15 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
16 277 U.S. at 464-465. 
7majority affirmed the conspiracy convictions under National Prohibition Act that were 
based on the eavesdropping evidence. 
 
Today, the case of Olmstead v. United States is primarily remembered for the 
vigorous dissent authored by Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Well before Olmstead, Brandeis 
was known for his co-authorship of the seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The 
Right to Privacy” that advocated for enforceable common law rights against the invasion 
of personal privacy especially in the face of the development of new technologies such as 
photography.17 
In his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis presented a far-sighted critique regarding the 
government’s use of the new technology to invade the privacy of its citizens. In contrast 
to the majority’s reliance on concepts of trespass law to limit the zone of privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis articulated a broader concept of 
constitutionally protected privacy that transcends both property interests and materialism: 
 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the 
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his 
intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought 
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions 
and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.  To protect, that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.18 
Close to forty years later, the United States Supreme Court overruled the holding 
in Olmstead v. United States. In Katz v. United States19, the Court held that the FBI’s 
placement of a microphone on the roof of an enclosed public telephone booth to 
eavesdrop and tape record telephone calls made by an illegal gambling suspect, without a 
warrant, constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether or not a 
physical intrusion had taken place. In reaching its decision in Katz v. United States, the 
Court’s majority rejected both a strict reliance on trespass law to define the scope of 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment as well as Brandeis’ much broader 
concept that the Fourth Amendment gave Americans “the right to be let alone” by other 
people. Nevertheless, by mandating for the first time that the police obtain a court-
ordered warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance, the Katz decision established 
 
17 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890); See also, Leebron, The Right to 
Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law, 41 Case W. Res. 769 (1991); Rosen, The Unwanted 
Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (2001), pp.5-7.  
18 277 U.S. at 479. 
19 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
8a significant judicial check on government agents randomly engaging in such 
surveillance.20 
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan formulated the now uniform test for 
determining whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to a particular set of facts 
including whether a particular use of a new invasive technology is unconstitutional: a) 
whether the individual possesses a subjective expectation of privacy; and b) whether the 
individual’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable’.”21 Despite continued judicial reliance on Justice Harlan’s Katz formulation 
regarding the applicable test for what constitutes a protected expectation of privacy, as 
early as 1971 Justice Harlan distanced himself from the formulation noting that it can 
“lead to the substitution of words for analysis” and emphasized that the critical question 
“is whether under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should 
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the 
protection of a warrant requirement.”22 
B.  The Fourth Amendment Outside and Inside the Home 
 
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a series of federal court 
decisions that have determined that, in most cases, the use of a tracking device to monitor 
the location of vehicles and containers are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  The 
primary exception to this rule is when the device is utilized to determine what is taking 
place within a person’s home.    
 
In 1983, in United States v. Knotts,23 the Supreme Court decided that the police 
did not have to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment before using a radio beeper 
to monitor the movement and location of a vehicle. The Court portrayed the use of such 
tracking technology as a mere extension of the police’s power to engage in visual 
surveillance of a criminal suspect. 
 
In Knotts, the police had placed a battery operated radio transmitter in a drum 
containing chloroform as part of a drug investigation.  After the drug suspect purchased 
the drum, the police used the beeper’s signals to assist in conducting surveillance of the 
movement and location of the suspect’s car containing the drum of chloroform. The 
beeper transmissions, along with additional visual surveillance by the police, resulted in 
the issuance of a warrant and the disclosure of a clandestine drug laboratory located in a 
rural Wisconsin cabin. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court applied a broad legal 
rule that renders the use of most human tracking devices attached to vehicles to be 
outside of Fourth Amendment protections: “A person traveling in an automobile on 
 
20 389 U.S. at 350-353; See also, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1967). 
21 389 U.S. at 361. 
22United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
23 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
9public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”24 
Under Knotts, whether the vehicle is driven unseen on an empty highway, through 
a long dark tunnel or an unpaved obscure mountainous road is irrelevant.  The mere 
exposure of the vehicle to the sunlight or the exterior darkness grants the police, without 
a warrant, to monitor the movement of the vehicle utilizing a tracking device lawfully 
placed.   
 
The principle applied in Knotts was based on earlier cases that decided Americans 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy while outside the home because others may be 
able to observe them. This voluntary exposure exception to Fourth Amendment 
protections has been long recognized by the Supreme Court. Under the exception, it does 
not matter whether the exposure is intentional or inadvertent because the act of exposure 
defeats any claimed expectation of privacy. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that this limited conception of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment would be equally applicable to the use of location devices that are legally 
attached or carried by an individual on public streets, roads and trails. An expansive 
application of this principle to new location technology in an unregulated market 
economy would permit anyone to electronically track anyone else in public. 
 
One year after Knotts, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo,25 was called 
upon to determine whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when the police during 
another drug investigation used a beeper in a can of chemicals to determine the can’s 
location within a private residence not open to visual surveillance. Like Knotts, the police 
in Karo had used beeper transmissions and visual surveillance to follow the movement of 
the can to various locations.  However, unlike Knotts, the police continued to utilize the 
beeper to determine whether the can was located in the private house. In concluding that 
the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Karo majority applied a core Fourth 
Amendment principle that a search and seizure inside a home without a warrant is 
presumptively unreasonable absent an exigent circumstance. Based on the fact that the 
beeper allowed the police to learn that the can was located in the house and allowed for 
them to monitor its internal movement, the Court concluded that the use of the tracking 
device constituted an unlawful search under Fourth Amendment.  
 
The broad scope of judicially recognized Fourth Amendment protections against 
technological surveillance within the home was exemplified in the 2001 decision in Kyllo 
v. United States.26 At the same time, the Kyllo decision suggests that the proliferation of 
invasive technological tools in general public use may eviscerate any reasonable 
expectation to privacy within one’s home.  
 
24 460 U.S. at 281. 
25 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
26 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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In Kyllo, the police suspected that marijuana was being grown inside a home 
utilizing high-density halide lamps.  In order to determine whether such lamps were being 
utilized, the police while seated in their car in the street, scanned the home utilizing a 
thermal imager to detect infrared radiation that is invisible to the naked eye. The scanning 
device reported that portions of the house were hotter than other sections of the house and 
neighboring homes. In concluding that the police’s use of the thermal-imaging device 
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it was capable of detecting 
lawful behavior in the house, the Kyllo majority stated: 
 
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, 
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable 
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”27 
At present, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment with 
regard to more advanced forms of tracking technology such as GPS, RFID or real time 
cell site monitoring. Based on Supreme Court precedent since Katz, it is unlikely that the 
Court will rule that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to the police utilizing 
such devices to electronically track movement in public. However, a strong argument can 
be made that based on the scope of private information obtainable through GPS and 
cellular tracking technology the Fourth Amendment probable cause and warrant 
requirements should be found applicable.28 In 2005, a federal District Court in New York, 
relying on the Knotts decision, ruled that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when 
the police attached GPS devices to the defendant’s vehicles because the defendant had no 
expectation of privacy while driving on public roadways. In contrast, a federal judge in 
Maryland has questioned, without deciding, whether the extraordinary amount of detailed 
personal information obtainable through the use of a GPS device would render it subject 
to Fourth Amendment constraints.29 
The Kyllo and Karo decisions strongly suggest that the use of GPS, RFID and real 
time cell site technology by the police to monitor the location of an individual or object 
within a home will be subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Based on 
the portability of cell phones, lawful public location surveillance by the police under 
Knotts can easily be transformed into unlawful surveillance under Karo by the cell phone 
being carried into a home or other private space. Last year, three United States District 
Court Magistrates issued decisions raising such Fourth Amendment concerns with respect 
to warrantless real time cell site monitoring.30 
27533 U.S. at 40. 
28 The State of Washington Supreme Court adopted this reasoning when it interpreted that State’s broader 
constitutional provision protecting “private affairs.” State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 
(2003)(en banc) .See also, Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment. 46 B.C.L. Rev. 
661, 695-697 (2005).  
29 United States v. Moran, 349 F.Supp.2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); United States v Berry, 300 F.Supp. 2d 366 
(D.Ct. Md. 2004).  
30 See, In Re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 
F.Supp. 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In the Matter of an Application of the United States for an Order (1) 
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Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Kyllo decision contains an ominous 
caveat regarding Fourth Amendment protections against electronic surveillance within a 
home: it is limited to devices that are not “in general public use.”31 This expressed 
limitation in the Kyllo holding raises the possibility that the proliferation of cell phones 
and inexpensive GPS devices could lead the Supreme Court to conclude that electronic 
monitoring within a home using such devices is not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  
 
C.  The Thirteenth Amendment and Human Tracking 
 
Professors Jerome Dobson and Peter F. Fisher have applied the term “geoslavery” 
to describe how new location tracking devices can result in coercive control over human 
movement and direction.32 The metaphorical application of the term slavery to electronic 
human tracking has both historical precedence and legal relevance.33 From well before 
the Civil War through the 1930’s, phrases such as “wage slavery” and “industrial 
slavery” were frequently applied to describe the oppressed conditions and status of 
workers.34 The brutal reality of chattel slavery was obviously and substantially more 
oppressive than 19th Century working conditions or contemporary use of electronic 
monitoring. Nevertheless, in considering possible legal restraints applicable to human 
tracking it is relevant to consider the value such devices would have had for slaveholders 
in the 19th Century, the impact such technology would have had on American history and 
whether such devices constitute a vestige of slavery. 
 
Historians John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger have detailed and 
documented the amount of time and resources Southern slaveholders had to expend in 
searching for and capturing runaway slaves.35 Their study highlights that essential aspects 
of American slavery included restrictions on the freedom of movement of enslaved 
African-Americans and severe corporal punishment imposed by slaveholders and 
overseers when slaves were caught escaping or captured following escape.  
 
Many in bondage attempted and succeeded in escaping for different motives 
including legal emancipation, reunions with family members and escape from 
particularly brutal owners. The method and direction of escape differed widely causing 
slave owners to rely on speculation and surmise in seeking to track down their escaped 
human property.36 As a means of locating and capturing those who escaped, slaveholders 
 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 396 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application 
of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller 
Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Sealed) and the Production of Real Time Cell Site 
Information, 2005 WL 3160860 (D.Ct. Md. 2005). 
31 533 U.S. at 40. 
32 Dobson and Fisher, Geoslavery, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Spring 2003, 22(1), pp.47-52. 
33 Foner, pp. 29-31. 
34 Foner, pp. 60-62, 142, 199-202. 
35 Franklin and Schweninger, pp.149-181.  
36 Franklin and Schweninger, pp. 97-123. 
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hired lawyers, petitioned state legislatures, purchased newspapers advertisements and 
utilized slave catchers.  These means of human tracking were expensive and inefficient. 
 
American concerns regarding the location and capture of those who escaped from 
bondage can be found in the United States Constitution. Slaveholder interest in 
maintaining physical and legal control over their human chattel was so great that the 
Constitution was drafted to contain the Fugitive Slave Clause aimed at guaranteeing the 
return of a runaway who succeeded in an interstate escape.37 The Fugitive Slave Clause, 
originally proposed by a South Carolina delegate to the Constitutional Convention, was 
aimed at insuring that slaveholders had a constitutionally based means of obtaining the 
return of a runaway slave who had escaped to a free state without the drafters’ using the 
word slavery.38 In 1793, the Second Congress enacted legislation granting slaveholders 
and their agents a specific legal procedure permitting them to seize an individual and take 
him or her before a magistrate to obtain a certificate requiring a return to bondage in a 
slave state.39 
As part of the Compromise of 1850, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act 
aimed at easing the ability of Southern slaveholders to recapture fugitive slaves through 
federal judicial means. However, rather than calming the rising national dispute over 
slavery, the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act precipitated an increase in aggressive 
Abolitionist activity including active resistance to the capture of freed slaves.40 
The 1851 Thomas Sims’s Case41 is an example of the type of antebellum litigation 
that resulted when slave owners sought the return of a runaway. On April 3, 1851, under 
the powers of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Commissioner George T. Curtis of the 
United States Circuit Court issued a warrant to the Massachusetts federal marshal 
requiring the capture of Sims, an African-American “fugitive from labor” to answer a 
complaint filed on behalf of a Georgia slave owner.42 Following Sims’s capture and 
imprisonment pursuant to the warrant, a habeas corpus petition was filed in 
Massachusetts’s state court seeking to free Sims and challenging the Fugitive Slave Law. 
The petition was heard before Massachusetts’ Chief Judge Lemuel Shaw, the father-in-
law of Herman Melville. To avoid the recurrence of Abolitionists’ physical efforts to 
rescue Sims, heavy chains were placed around the courthouse.43 Although personally 
opposed to slavery, Chief Judge Shaw denied the writ concluding that the Fugitive Slave 
Act was constitutional based on the history of the Fugitive Slave Clause and precedent 
 
37 United States Constitution, Art. IV, section 2, cl. 3 states: “No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to who 
such Service or Labour may be due.”  
38 Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in Making of the Constitution, pp. 89, 91 (Knopf, 1997). 
39 Thomas Sims’s Case, 61 Mass. 285, 297-298, 301-302 (1851). 
40 Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States 1837-1860, pp. 236-239 (Oxford, 
1976); Mayer, All on Fire: William Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery, pp.406-442 (St. Martins Press, 
1998); Sennett, North Star Country: Upstate New York and the Crusade for African American Freedom, 
pp. 127-153 (Syracuse University, 2002). 
41 Supra. 
42 61 Mass. at 285. 
43 Delbanco, Melville, pp. 153-154 (Knopf, 2005) 
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upholding the earlier 1793 federal fugitive slave law.44 Following Chief Judge Shaw’s 
application of judicial restraint, Sims was returned to bondage in Georgia and subjected 
to a severe public beating.45 
The use of GPS and RFID technology by slave owners would have perpetuated 
the enslavement of African-Americans, substantially decreased the cost of tracking down 
runaways and altered American history. The use of real time location technology would 
have vastly improved the monitoring of the daily productivity of slave labor thereby 
increasing efficiency along with the economic value and power of America’s peculiar 
institution. Such technology would have also made slave resistance and escape far more 
difficult. Through GPS or RFID implants, slaveholders would have been able to easily 
locate and identify individuals who succeeded in escaping. Working together, 
slaveholders would have been able to establish geo-fences and a communications 
network that would have substantially aided in slaveholder domination over the personal 
lives of those held in bondage. By undermining the ability of individuals such as 
Frederick Douglas from escaping, these technological tools may have decreased the 
awareness in the North of the horrors of American slavery prior to the Civil War.46 
In 1865, Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment, subsequently ratified by 
the States, banning slavery and involuntary servitude. Unlike other constitutional 
amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment uniquely restricts both private conduct as well 
as governmental action.47 The Thirteenth Amendment states: 
 
“1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime  
 whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the  
 the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
 
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment was never intended to be limited to ending the 
enslavement of African-Americans. In 1911, the United States Supreme Court 
highlighted the amendment’s broad breath when it described the amendment as “a charter 
of universal civil freedom of all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag” 
that was intended to abolish both slavery as well all vestiges, badges and incidents of 
slavery.48 In addition to outlawing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment also prohibits 
involuntary servitude.  
 
The amendment granted Congress the power to enact legislation targeted at 
eliminating those badges and incidents of slavery including the “privilege to go and 
come” as one pleases.49 Congressional authority under the amendment includes the power 
 
44 61 Mass. at 294-307. 
45 Delbanco, p. 154. 
46 McFeely, Frederick Douglass (Norton, 1991). 
47 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988). 
48 Bailey v State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
49 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 U.S. 409, 429-430 (1968)(quoting from Senate Judiciary Chairman 
Trumbell during a 1866 legislative debate). 
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“to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to 
translate that determination into effective legislation.” 50 However, it was not intended to 
be the basis for challenging various established societal power relationships such as 
parent-child.51 
Based on the history and interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Alexander 
Tsesis has argued that the amendment provides the constitutional predicate for the 
enactment of broad federal laws banning public and private limitations on universal 
liberties.52 
Whether a majority of the United States Supreme Court would concur with 
Tsesis’ thesis of such broad congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
remains in doubt. Various Supreme Court decisions in the past fifteen years have 
demarcated newly established limitations on congressional legislative power under the 
Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment and the remedial provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.53 
Nevertheless, a reasonably strong argument can be made that Congress does have 
the constitutional power under the remedial provision of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
ban the use of tracking devices to dominate and control the location of others. Imposing 
restrictions, control and monitoring over another’s location constitutes a vestige and 
incident of slavery.  
 
In addition, mandatory tracking or identification implants or attachments on 
another human being would be subject to court challenge under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Such devices are the technological equivalent, in many respects, to various 
slaveholder tools, including branding, utilized to keep African-Americans from escaping 
from bondage or as punishment for such escapes. As such, the use of such devices to 
establish geo-fences and even impose corporal punishment would constitute a vestige of 
slavery. In addition, the imposition of physical injury or threat of physical injury 
emanating from a tracking device would be subject to challenge as a form of involuntary 
servitude especially if the electronic punishment is aimed at forcing an individual to 
continue working.54 
50 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 U.S. at 440. 
51 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) 
52 Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A Legal History (NYU Press, 2004), pp. 86-
87, 89, 104-105. 
53 See, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)(federal statute prohibiting guns in the vicinity of public 
schools declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it went beyond congressional power granted by the 
Commerce Clause; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(federal overtime law determined to be 
unconstitutional under the Eleventh Amendment to the extent that it granted employees the right to sue 
State employers in federal court); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)(portion of federal 
Violence Against Women Act declared unconstitutional as beyond congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause; Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)(holding the 
Americans with Disabilities Act unconstitutional as applied to a State’s workforce). 
54 Dobson and Fisher, Geoslavery, pp.47-49; Fisher and Dobson, Who Knows Where You Are, and Who 
Should in the Era of Mobile Geography? Geography, Vol. 88(4), pp. 335-336 (2003); United States v. 
Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944, 952. 
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D.  State Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Tracking Devices 
 
The application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test to new technological 
intrusions is not without its critics. As Jeffrey Rosen has pointed out “as advances in the 
technology of monitoring and searching have made ever more intrusive surveillance 
possible, expectations of privacy have naturally diminished, with a corresponding 
reduction in constitutional protections.”55 The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. 
Campbell termed the reasonable expectation test “a formula for expressing a conclusion 
rather than a starting point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations 
that are the real bases in which Fourth Amendment searches are defined.”56 
Various state courts have determined, under their respective state constitutions, 
that the police are required to obtain a warrant prior to utilizing an electronic device. In 
reaching such legal conclusions, the courts have recognized that electronic tracking 
devices are not mere technological enhancements to law enforcement vision but rather a 
substantial intrusion into an individual’s privacy and autonomy.  
 
In State v. Campbell, the Oregon Constitution was interpreted to prohibit the 
police’s warrantless use of a radio transmitter to locate a private vehicle. In that case, the 
police used a radio transmitter attached to a burglary suspect’s car to track his movements 
after the police were unable to maintain constant visual surveillance. In determining that 
a warrant is required prior to the police utilizing a tracking device, the Oregon Supreme 
Court rejected the Supreme Court’s rationale in Knotts and determined that the 
transmitter was a location finder rather than a mere extension of police visual tracking. In 
substitution of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Oregon Supreme Court 
defined a privacy interest as “an interest in freedom from particular forms of scrutiny” 
and concluded that the use of a radio transmitter to locate a person or object constituted a 
significant limitation on the freedom from scrutiny.57 
In reaching its conclusion, the Oregon court recognized the perniciousness of 
technological tracking devices by creating a daily fear of being watched:  
 
“The limitation is made more substantial by the fact that the radio transmitter 
 is more difficult to detect than would-be observers who must rely upon the sense  
of sight. Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of one’s possessions,  
one can never be sure that one’s location is not being monitored by means of a 
radio transmitter. Thus, individuals must more readily assume that they are the 
objects of government scrutiny.”58 
55 Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, pp. 60-61. 
56 State v. Campbell, 306 Ore. 157, 164, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1988).  
57 306 Ore. at 170, 172, 759 P.2d at 27, 30. However, more recently in State v. Meredith, 337 Or. 299, 96 
P.3d 342 (2004), the same court found that the police’s warrantless use of a beeper on an employer’s 
vehicle, with the employer’s consent, did not violate the employee’s privacy rights under Oregon’s 
constitution. 
58 306 Ore. at 172, 759 P.2d at 30. American history over the past century provides a reasonable basis for 
concerns relating to unlawful electronic surveillance of legitimate political activities, See, Branch, Pillar of 
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In 2003, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that under Washington’s more 
protective constitutional provision regarding searches and seizures, the police were 
required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to attaching a GPS device to a 
citizen’s vehicle.59 In accord with the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis, Washington’s 
highest court concluded that a GPS device replaces rather than augments police visual 
surveillance. In reaching its decision, Washington’s highest court recognized the 
enormous intrusive power of GPS devices to provide a detailed picture of an individual’s 
daily life:  
 
“[u]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method of surveillance,  
making it possible to acquire an enormous amount of personal information about 
the citizen under circumstances where the individual is unaware that every single 
vehicle trip taken and the duration of every single stop may be recorded by the 
government.”60 
Two New York State trial courts have rendered conflicting decisions regarding 
whether the New York State Constitution requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to 
attaching a GPS device to a vehicle. In People v. Lacey61, one county judge, without 
articulating a developed legal analysis, concluded in 2004 that a warrant was required. 
Last year, another county judge in People v. Gant62 reached the opposite conclusion 
based on the Knotts analysis that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy while driving on public roads. 
 
In addition to state constitutional limitations regarding governmental search and 
seizure, certain states have explicit constitutional privacy provisions that may form the 
basis for future challenges to governmental and private use of tracking devices.  For 
example, California Constitution, Art. 1, §1 contains an explicit reference to a right of 
privacy applicable to both private as well as state conduct. 63 In 1970, Illinois in direct 
response to the development of new intrusive technologies, amended its’ constitution to 
include an expressed provision protecting its citizens against invasions of privacy 
 
Fire: American in the King Years (Simon and Schuster 1998); Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. (W.W. Norton, 1981). At the same, publicity surrounding the use of electronic tracking devices can lead 
to irrational concerns. See, Dunne v. Police Department, 128 Fed. Appx. 673 (9th Cir. 2005). In Dunne, the 
pro se plaintiff’s claim that a GPS device had been implanted in his left eye socket to render him a sex 
slave was dismissed because he was unable to prove the existence of the GPS implant. 
59 State v. Jackson, supra.. Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that “[n]o person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” 
60 150 Wn.2d at 262, 76 P.3d at 223. See also, State v. Kelly, 68 Haw. 213, 708 P.2d 820 (1985), where the 
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the police’s warrantless installation of a beeper in a photograph album 
was both an unreasonable search and seizure under the Hawaiian Constitution.  
61 3 Misc.3d 1103(A), 787 N.Y.S.2d 680, 2004 WL 1040676 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2004); 
62 __Misc.__, 2005 WL 1767655 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2005)  
63 Hill v. NCAA, 7 Cal.4th 1, 865 P.2d 633 (1994); California Constitution, Art. 1, §1 states: “All people are 
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, 
and privacy.” 
17
including the use of electronic surveillance.64 Other states such as Hawaii, Alaska and 
Florida have similar specific state constitutional provisions protecting the right to 
privacy.65 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how these various state constitutional privacy 
provisions will be applied to new electronic tracking devices. Unlike Oregon’s highest 
court, the California Supreme Court in Hill v. NCAA, ruled that in order to be able to 
allege a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff must establish 
a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.66 To the extent that this standard is 
applied, state constitutional privacy language may not form the basis for establishing 
limits on the use of electronic surveillance to track public activities.  
II. The Legal Implications of Human Tracking Implant Technology  
 
The development, marketing and use of human subdermal RFID and GPS 
implants raise challenging and new legal and ethical issues. As early as 1985, California 
veterinarian Harris L. Stoddard was working on the development of an implantable 
identification chip for use with animals.67 Implanted RFID tracking devices are used 
frequently in the identification of animals. The British company Trovan, Ltd. markets 
various forms of implantable transponders and readers throughout the world for animal 
and human identification.68 
The first known experiment regarding the use of a human tracking implant took 
place at the University of Reading in England in 1998. Professor of Cybernetics Kevin 
Warwick had an RFID tracking device implant placed in his arm that enabling his 
movements on campus to be monitored for one week. An expressed purpose for the 
 
64 Will County Grand Jury 152 Ill.2d 381, 390-392, 604 N.E.2d 929 (1992). Illinois Constitution, Article 1, 
§ 6 provides that: “The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other 
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of 
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, 
supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized.” 
65 See, Hawaii Const. Art. 1, § 6: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to 
implement this right;” Alaska Const. Art. I, § 22: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall 
not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section;" Florida Const. Art. 1 § 23: “Every natural 
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life 
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access 
to public records and meetings as provided by law.” 
66 7 Cal.4th at 20, 865 P.2d at 846. See also, State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska, 1978) (Alaska 
Supreme Court’s explicit adoption of Justice Harlan’s formulation in Katz to the Alaska’s state 
constitutional right to privacy.  
67 www.avidid.com/stoddard.html. 
68 www.trovan.com/company.htm. One example of the ubiquitous use of Trovan products was observed 
fortuitously during a 2005 family visit to Namibia where leopards have been implanted with Trovan RFID 
devices as part of a concerted effort to preserve their endangered population. During the same trip, I 
observed elephants with GPS devices around their necks as part of a study of their migration patterns in 
southern Africa.  
18
experiment was to demonstrate the inherent dangers to personal privacy connected with 
implant technology.69 
Dr. John D. Halamka, the Chief Information Officer for the Harvard Medical 
Center, has conducted a more recent and longer experiment in the use of a voluntary 
human RFID implant containing a 16-digit medical identifier. With the use of a handheld 
RFID transponder, Dr. Halamka’s implanted identifier can be obtained and used to 
discover his identity and his doctor through an internet site maintained by the 
manufacturer. Significantly, the implant does not include any medical history or any 
known disabilities and is not equipped to monitor Dr. Halamka’s location. His 
willingness to participate in the experiment was an outgrowth of Dr. Halamka’s 
experiences as an emergency room resident when he was unable to determine the 
identification of patients. In his article, Dr. Halamka acknowledges the possibility that the 
implant can lead to invasion of privacy due to the non-use of encryption technology, the 
unauthorized use of transponders and hacking. In response to claims by others that human 
implant chips are Orwellian in nature, Dr. Halamka concedes: “I have not investigated 
these or other moral, religious, or political implications of having an implanted 
identifier.”70 
In general, the marketing and publicity surrounding these implant products focus 
primarily on the purported convenience, security and the ability to alleviate fear. The 
impact on personal privacy, the products’ reliability and the interception of data by third 
parties has not received similar coverage. The American company Applied Digital 
Solutions, Inc. markets an RFID VeriChip implantable for humans that can be used for 
identification and security as well a GPS wristband product known as Digital Angel. In 
2003, Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. announced that it had developed a human implant 
that can function as a GPS personal location device.71 In 2006, Qustar Ltd. plans on 
commencing the marketing to parents of two models of implantable GPS devices aimed 
at responding to American parental fear of child abductions.72 
Companies are aggressively promoting human implant products in the United 
States and abroad utilizing standard advertising techniques. They are being marketed for 
both security and recreational purposes. RFID implants are being publicized as a mere 
technological extension to the body-piercing trend that permits bodily integration with 
computers. A technology entrepreneur who volunteered for an implants in both hands 
admitted to the New York Times “the symbolism of the tag is much more of a big deal as 
a social marker.”73 A website has been established in an effort to expand this social 
phenomenon of voluntary technological branding.74 
69 BBC News, Technology gets under the skin, April 24, 1998, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/158007.stm; 
www.kevinwarwick.org. 
70 Halamka, Straight from the Shoulder, The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 353:331-333, No. 4 
(2005). 
71 adsx.com/news/2003/051303.html; Edmundson, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer 
Privacy Be Lost In Order for People to Be Found, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 207, 210 (2005). 
72 qustar.com/ver1/news/announces.php. 
73 Bahney, High Tech, Under the Skin, New York Times, February 2, 2006. 
74 http;//tagged.kaos.gen.nz.  
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In Mexico, the Verichip has been implanted in government officials for access 
to a secure government building and non-government volunteers have received implants 
in response to their fear of being kidnapped.75 RFID implants are being marketed for 
voluntary use by tavern patrons to avoid having to pay with cash or credit cards and for 
computer users who cannot remember the passwords.76 Others, with an economic interest 
in the technology, have publicly volunteered to receive implants as part of a marketing 
strategy.77 
The development, marketing and use of human RFID and GPS implants raise 
important legal and ethical issues.78 At present, the legal ramifications regarding 
implants, including the legality of government mandated human implants, remains 
undeveloped.   
 
It is improbable that a government program requiring human implants for non-
criminals would be found to be lawful. Such a mandate would run afoul of Supreme 
Court due process jurisprudence and precedent establishing a constitutionally protected 
right to privacy against governmental intrusions into intimate personal affairs.79 
Mandated government intrusions into the human body implicate substantial liberty 
interests protected under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.80 
In Rochin v. California,81 the Court held that the police violated the due process 
rights of a drug suspect when they compelled an involuntary pumping of his stomach in 
order to seize two capsules containing drugs that he had been swallowed. Justice Felix 
 
75 McHugh, A Chip in Your Shoulder, Slate, November 10, 2004, www.slate.msn.com/id/2109477. 
76 Purohit, Technology Gets Under Clubbers’ Skin, CNN, June 9, 2004, 
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/06/09/spain.club; Cramb, Microchip to allow wallet-free drinking,
Telegraph, January 17, 2005; McGeever, Computer chips get under skin of enthusiasts, Reuters, January 6, 
2006. 
77For example, in 2003, the head of a Louisiana company that distributes the VeriChip announced that 
she had received an implant as part of the commencement of her company’s marketing efforts. 
www.findmellc.com/breaking_news.asp. The owner of a technology company has received implants in 
both hands and has authored a book setting forth “cool projects” connected with RFID products. Bahney, 
High Tech, Under the Skin, New York Times, February 2, 2006; McGeever, Computer chips get under skin 
of enthusiasts, Reuters, January 6, 2006. Law Professor Patricia J. Williams has questioned whether the 
announcement by VeriChip board member and former United States Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Tommy Thompson of his intent to receive a GPS implant was related to a marketing strategy.  
Williams, Telly-Tommy, The Nation, August 15/22, 2005.  
78 Edmundson, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer Privacy Be Lost In Order for People 
to Be Found, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 207 (2005); Dobson and Fisher, Geoslavery. 
79 See, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)(invalidating a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices based on a constitutional right 
to privacy premised on various provisions of the Bill of Rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)(invaliding a state anti-sodomy law as an unconstitutional abridgement of the right to privacy);See 
also, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9thCir.1998) (recognizing a 
constitutional right to privacy cause of action against a federally funded research laboratory that conducted 
unconsented testing for traits of sickle cell anemia, syphilis and pregnancy.) 
80 See Washington v. Harpur, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 278 (1990). 
81 Supra. 
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Frankfurter, writing for the majority, emphasized the significance of coerced 
governmental intrusions into the body: 
 
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy 
of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, 
the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents-this course of proceeding by 
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened 
sensibilities. They are methods, to close to the rack and the screw to permit of 
constitutional differentiation.82 
Under Fourth Amendment, the Court treats all physical intrusions by 
governmental officials into a human body as a search and seizure because it violates an 
expectation of privacy recognized by our society. This reasonable expectation of privacy 
against unwanted bodily intrusions is balanced against the articulated legitimate 
governmental interest to determine whether the search was unreasonable.83 The 
application of this balancing test is very different when “special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”84 When the “special needs” concerns are not related to crime detection, 
courts will make a context-specific inquiry balancing the competing private and public 
interests.85 
For example, mandatory drug and alcohol testing programs in employment and 
public schools have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment based on special safety 
needs that outweighed the reasonable expectation of privacy against such bodily 
intrusions.86 In contrast, a state hospital policy, established with the aid of the police, 
under which non-consenting pregnant patients were subjected to urine drug tests and 
were subject to criminal prosecution if they tested positive for cocaine was struck down 
as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.87 In 1997, the Supreme Court invalided on 
Fourth Amendment grounds a state law mandating that state political candidates certify 
that he or she has taken a drug test and that the result was negative. In striking down the 
statute, the Supreme Court found that the State lacked any special need based on the lack 
of evidence demonstrating a drug problem among elected state officials or that they 
performed safety sensitive job duties.88 
82 342 U.S. at 172. 
83 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S.602 (1989) 
84 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) 
(Blackman, J., concurring in judgment). 
85 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). 
86 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, supra; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)(upholding the use of drug testing for government employees as a condition of 
promotion or transfer to certain positions directly involving drug interdiction or requiring the employee to 
carry a firearm); Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug 
testing for high school students participating in interscholastic sports). 
87 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
88 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. at 321-322. 
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Based on the sustained nature of an implant’s intrusion into the body, it is 
improbable that the courts, in most situations, would find that a special government 
interest outweighed the liberty and privacy interests protected under the United States 
Constitution. 
 
Without new legislation banning the practice, the common law tort of assault and 
battery, as well as the Thirteenth Amendment, would form the bases for challenging 
privately mandated human tracking implants. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospital89, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that “every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”90 
When someone is subjected to unwanted non-emergency surgery, they have the right to 
sue for damages for assault.91 
Mandated human RFID implants that contain confidential medical information 
may also violate the confidentiality provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).92 A 
mandate that medical information protected under HIPAA be made accessible through an 
RFID implant to anyone with an appropriate reader would violate HIPAA’s confidential 
provisions.  To the extent that an employer mandates implants for employees containing 
confidential medical information would render the employer vulnerable to liability based 
on the ADA’s confidentiality requirements with respect to medical records.93 
The population most vulnerable to a potential program of mandated human 
tracking implants would be criminal convicts especially those convicted of sex crimes. In 
Ohio, a county official and sheriff have stated their support for the use of implants to 
monitor ex-convicts.94 Various states have already enacted laws mandating lifetime 
electronic monitoring for certain sex offenders. Based on the current level of public fear 
connected with sex offense, it is probably only a matter of time before more politicians 
call for the use of tracking implants on certain criminal convicts.  
 
Whether the Court will deem the use of tracking implants for inmates and other 
convicts to be violative of due process remains to be seen.  Even when prison officials 
intrude on substantial liberty interests of prisoners, the regulation will be upheld as long 
as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.95 
For at least a decade, electronic wrist and ankle bracelets have been required as a 
condition of house arrest, probation and parole to enable officials to keep track of the 
offenders in and outside the home. Individuals under house arrest, along with 
probationers and parolees, are granted “conditional liberty” subject to special and unique 
 
89 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
90 211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93. 
91 211 N.Y. at 130, 105 N.E. at 93. 
92 See, 42 U.S.C. §1320d-2; 42 U.S.C. §12101 et. seq. 
93 See, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2005). 
94 Lolli, Official: Implant Chips Into Offenders, Cincinnati Post, March 29, 2005 
95 Washington v. Harpur, 494 U.S. at 223-224. 
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restrictions including a significantly reduced expectation of privacy.96 Due to the 
limitations connected with the radial scope of RFID technology, electronic bracelets 
utilizing GPS technology are increasingly being utilized throughout the country.  In 2005, 
the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that a GPS device that was able to track a 
probationer’s movement outside the home violated the statutory definition of a 
monitoring device permissible for home detention.97 
As a practical matter, most people convicted of a crime would prefer electronic 
location monitoring to incarceration. This alternative to prison serves various societal 
interests because it is less expensive and grants the offender a greater opportunity to 
engage in rehabilitative activities.  
 
Although electronic bracelets have been utilized successfully, the fact that they 
are less intrusive than electronic implants does not preclude the possibility that human 
electronic implants will be found to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when 
applied to criminal offenders. In a series of Fourth Amendment decisions, the Supreme 
Court has been dismissive of arguments premised on the mere existence of less intrusive 
means.98 Under the Fourth Amendment special needs and general balancing tests, federal 
courts have sustained state laws mandating the extraction of DNA samples from the 
bodies of various classes of convicted offenders to be utilized in a computerized DNA 
database.99 In any challenge to possible future use of human implants on criminal 
offenders, strong national evidence will have to be presented to a court demonstrating the 
success of the less intrusive electronic bracelets along with evidence establishing that 
implanted GPS technology is not more accurate or reliable than data stemming from a 
bracelet.   
 
III.   Federal Legislative Responses to Human Tracking and Cellular Technology 
 
In response to the development of electronic technology, Congress has enacted 
legislation placing certain restrictions on the use tracking technologies by federal law 
enforcement.  The protection of privacy against the use of tracking technologies, 
however, has not been a major congressional priority.   
 
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”).  The ECPA includes a specific provision regarding federal law enforcement 
use of mobile tracking devices to monitor the movement of an individual or object.100 
The purpose of the law was jurisdictional in nature. It did not place any expressed 
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substantive limits on the use of tracking devices, require the suppression of evidence for 
statutory violations or provide for any privacy protections beyond those recognized under 
the Fourth Amendment.101 
The ECPA does include statutory mandates requiring federal law enforcement to 
apply before a federal judge for issuance of a search warrant based on probable cause or a 
court order based on a lesser standard when it seeks the release of certain forms of 
subscriber information from a wireless company.102 Title III of ECPA establishes 
procedures relating to the use of pen registers and trap/trace devices, commonly referred 
to as a caller identification system, by federal law enforcement to capture the phone 
numbers of outgoing and incoming calls.103 In 1994, Congress enacted the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act prohibiting wireless providers 
from disclosing “any information that may disclose the physical location of the 
subscriber” based on call-identification information acquired through the government’s 
use of a pen register or trap/trace device.104 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act 
that contains an express limitation on the use or disclosure by telecommunication 
companies of call location information regarding mobile service customers.105 Litigation 
challenging the FCC regulations with respect to the nature of consumer authorization 
required for the disclosure of location information has substantially muddled the 
enforceability of this location privacy provision.106 Despite this continued lack of clarity 
related to consumer consent, United States District Court Magistrate Stephen William 
Smith has concluded that the statute places location information into “a special class of 
consumer information, which can only be used or disclosed in an emergency situation, 
absent express prior consent by the customer. Based on the statute, a cell phone user may 
very well have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his call location 
information.” 107 
Congress has been resistant to passing legislation aimed at placing limitations on 
the ability of employers to impose electronic workplace tracking. In 1993, the Privacy for 
Consumers and Workers Act, was introduced in Congress that sought to set limitations on 
the use tracking technology in the workplace including mandating written notification to 
employees regarding the surveillance. The bill died in committee. One year later, in 2000, 
the Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act was introduced. The proposed legislation sought 
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to amend the ECPA to mandate employers to provide written notice to employees 
regarding employer use of tracking technology. Congress never acted upon the bill.108 
IV.    State Common and Statutory Law Response To Electronic Human Tracking 
 
A.  The Application of State Tort Law 
Since the 19th Century, various state courts have recognized common law 
invasion of privacy torts that may be applicable to the use of electronic tracking devices. 
There are four distinct privacy torts recognized today in many states: (a) unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of another’s name or likeness; 
c) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; (d) publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light before the public.109 Privacy torts grant individuals the 
right to bring a lawsuit for damages usually in state court against the person who invaded 
the individual’s privacy. 
The privacy tort with the strongest relevance to the use of location tracking 
devices is the intrusion on seclusion tort.110 The Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B 
defines the tort of intrusion on seclusion in the following manner: 
 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude  
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability  
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive  
to a reasonable person.  
This privacy tort is not limited to the physical trespass into another person’s home 
or other physical space. It has been found applicable to attempted eavesdropping on 
private conversations with or without the use of technological devices.111 
The viability of this type of lawsuit challenging the per se use of electronic 
tracking devices to follow another person outside the home remains dubious.112 Comment 
(c) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B states that there can not be liability for 
observing or photographing another person while he or she is walking on a public street 
because the person is not in seclusion.  
 
In 2005, the Connecticut Appellate Court issued the first appellate decision 
considering an intrusion upon seclusion claim based on the use of a GPS device.113 In 
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Turner v. American Car Rental, Inc., a rental company had installed a global positioning 
system in its vehicles as a means of controlling and punishing drivers for exceeding a set 
speed limit. Under the company’s policy and practice, the vehicle’s GPS receiver 
transmitted the speed and location of the vehicle to a monitoring company that in turn 
faxed the results to the rental company. In its form lease, the company stated that each 
rental vehicle contained a GPS receiver and set as a contractual condition that each time 
the rented vehicle exceeded 79 miles per hour for two minutes or longer, the leaser would 
be fined $150.00.114 In dismissing the invasion of privacy tort action, the Connecticut 
appellate court concluded that it was unaware of any legal precedent establishing that the 
installation of a GPS device in a car violates the privacy rights of the driver or that that 
driver has an expectation of privacy on a public highway.115 
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Knotts116that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to one’s location while driving led a 
United States District Court judge to dismiss an employee’s intrusion upon seclusion 
claim against his employer for monitoring him through the installation of a GPS device in 
the company van that the employee used during work and during non-work hours.117 
In Ohio, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a class action lawsuit brought 
by cell phone users against a large cellular phone service company for intrusion upon 
seclusion based on the company providing to a research firm specific information 
regarding its cell phone customers including their names, telephone numbers, addresses 
and social security numbers. The Ohio appellate court emphasized that in order to state a 
claim for intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiffs must allege private facts and that none of the 
information provided to the research company constituted private information.118 
Similarly, an intrusion upon seclusion action against an employer for videotape 
surveillance of an employee was dismissed because the videotaping was limited to the 
employee’s public activities.119 
In 2003, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an 
intrusion upon seclusion lawsuit against an internet-based investigation and information 
service company that had obtained employment information about the plaintiff’s daughter 
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Amy Boyer by making a pre-textual call to Ms. Boyer.  After obtaining the information, 
the company provided it to a New Hampshire man named Liam Youens who had ordered 
it over the internet for $109. After receiving the employment information from the 
company, Youens went to Ms. Boyer’s workplace and shot her dead before he committed 
suicide.120 In dismissing the mother’s intrusion upon seclusion claim in Remsburg v. 
Docusearch, Inc., the New  Hampshire Supreme Court specifically relied upon the public 
exposure exception to the right to privacy: 
 
A person’s employment, where he lives, and where he works are exposures 
which we all must suffer. We have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to  
our identity or as to where we live or work.  Our commuting to and from where 
we live and work is not done clandestinely and each place provides a facet of our  
total identity.121 
Nevertheless, based on societal concerns regarding the dangers of stalking and 
identity theft in the new technological age, the New Hampshire court ruled that if 
criminal misconduct against a third person is sufficiently foreseeable, an investigator has 
a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care when disclosing that person's personal 
information to a client.122 
B. State Statutory Limitations on Electronic Tracking Devices 
 
Many states have enacted legislation aimed at restricting the use of electronic 
devices by members of the public and the police. Other states are considering similar 
limitations on the use of such devices in vehicles.123 Most of these measures are aimed at 
creating new criminal prohibitions or procedures and expanding consumer protections 
with respect to rental companies. Due to the speed of technological change, the pace of 
legislative deliberations and the intricacy of the technology, these legislative measures 
have not included responses to human implants and cellular technology. Furthermore, 
state initiatives aimed at regulating location surveillance in the workplace have been 
unsuccessful.124 
In response to court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the warrantless 
use of tracking devices by police, various states have enacted laws requiring law 
enforcement officials to apply to a court for a judicial warrant before installing such 
devices. Many of these statutes place specific time limits on the period of 
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authorization.125 Other states have enacted laws regulating the use of tracking devices for 
criminal offenders subject to house arrest, probation or parole. 126 
In 1998, California Legislature enacted a criminal statute prohibiting the use of 
“an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a person.” The 
statute defines the phrase “electronic tracking device” as a device “attached to a vehicle 
or other movable thing that reveals its location or movement.” The legislation contains 
two consent exceptions: when the owner, leasor, or leasee of a vehicle has consented to 
the use of the device; and lawful use by law enforcement.127 In addition, California has 
enacted consumer legislation limiting the use of GPS technology by rental companies.
Under this law, rental companies are permitted to install GPS technology in their vehicles 
but are prohibited from using the electronic data to impose surcharges or fines.128 Similar 
consumer legislation regarding rental companies has been enacted in other states.129 
Texas, in 1999, enacted a criminal law prohibiting the installation of an 
“electronic or mechanical tracking device on a motor vehicle owned or leased by another 
person.” The Texas statute establishes a defense against criminal prosecutions for owner 
or leasee who has consented to the installation as well as law enforcement purposes. A
defense was also carved into the law for private investigators, who after obtaining written 
consent from the owner or leasee, can install the device in a vehicle or a in a private 
residential property. The private investigator defense permits distrustful employers, 
spouses or friends to utilize private detectives and GPS technology to track a third 
party.130 
Montana’s statutory limitation on electronic tracking devices was not made 
applicable to the tracking vehicles or humans. In 1999, the Montana legislature, acting 
based on the perceived needs of that state, enacted a law that prohibits hunters from 
utilizing electronic devices “to track the motion of a game animal and relay information 
on the animal’s movement to the hunter.” 131 
The enactment of these laws has led to at least three criminal prosecutions against 
individuals who have unlawfully used an electronic device. In 2000, Robert Sullivan’s 
wife commenced legal proceedings to end their marriage and she obtained a restraining 
order against him. In response, Sullivan installed a GPS device in her car to keep track of 
her activities. For over a month, the device was installed and removed by Sullivan to 
enable him to download the information.132 Sullivan was successfully prosecuted and his 
conviction affirmed under Colorado’s harassment by stalking statute that outlaws placing 
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another person under surveillance in a manner that would cause serious emotional 
distress.133 
In Wisconsin in 2002, a man pled no contest to stalking his former girlfriend by 
placing a GPS device under the hood of her car. The plea resulted from the police 
obtaining the electronic records of his use of the technology.134 
In Delaware, Nancy Biddle was prosecuted in 2005 for attaching a GPS tracking 
device to the frame of another woman’s car for tracking purposes. Ms. Biddle was 
convicted under Delaware’s invasion of privacy criminal statute that prohibits the 
nonconsensual installation “in any private place” of a device for “observing, 
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in that place.”135 
After reviewing the conflicting federal and state case law on the question of whether an 
individual has reasonable expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle, a Delaware 
judge convicted Ms. Biddle noting that that increased use of electronic devices is eroding 
person al liberty.136 
V.   The Use of Tracking Devices In Employment 
 
Increasingly, throughout the United States, private and public sector employers 
are utilizing RFID, GPS and cellular technology as a means of monitoring work 
performance.137 In 2004, employers spent approximately $9 billion in technological 
monitoring devices for the workplace.138 At least one United States employer, an Ohio 
surveillance company, has announced that two of its employees have received RFID 
implants for identification purposes.139 In a survey of 24, major federal agencies, the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 13 agencies had 
implemented or had plans to implement RFID technology.140 Employers justify the 
implementation of such technology in the name of safety, security, efficiency and 
productivity.141 However, employer use of this new technology does not usually stem 
from empirical data or anecdotal evidence demonstrating an increase in workplace 
fatalities and injuries or a decrease in efficiency and productivity.  
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As a practical matter, employers already have at their disposal many other 
effective and less intrusive managerial tools to deal with safety concerns, security and 
productivity: employee training; tachometers and odometers to measure speed, distance 
and mileage; intercom, two-way radios and cell phones; and supervisor and co-worker 
visual observations to ferret out employee misconduct. Electronic location monitoring 
enables employers to learn non-work related information including personal habits, tastes 
and interests of employees. In addition, this information can become vulnerable to third 
party access.142 
Based on the lack of empirical or anecdotal evidence, there appears to be one 
central explanation for the growing use of human tracking technology in employment: an 
effort by employers to expand their power and domination over their workforce. Twenty 
years ago, Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen recognized that employer use of electronic 
technology for employee monitoring is a modern means of implementing the 
management ideas of Frederick Taylor that are aimed at increasing productivity and 
maximizing employer profit.143 
In order to avoid the stigma of being perceived as engaging in excessive 
surveillance, some employers will rely on pretexts to justify the use of tracking 
technology.  Pretexts and secrecy are used to avoid a perception that the employer is 
using totalitarian tools or mistreating its employees. 
 
Prior to the purchase and implementation of workplace tracking technology, it is 
rare for an employer to discuss with its employees the purpose and nature of the new 
form of surveillance. Without a union representing the employees, the employer has no 
legal obligation to discuss or negotiate changes in terms and conditions in employment 
including the implementation of tracking technology.  Nevertheless, advocates for the 
expansive use of the new technology encourage employers to be open and honest with 
their employers.144 
An unusual public debate regarding the proposed implementation of tracking 
technology in employment took place in the City of Boston in 2004. On November 8, 
2004, the Boston City Council conducted a legislative hearing to consider a proposed 
order to encourage the installation of GPS devices on Boston’s 720 public school buses. 
Councillor John M. Tobin Jr., as chair of the Boston City Council’s Education 
Committee, scheduled the public hearing to examine the use of GPS technology as a 
means of keeping track of the location of students thereby enhancing their safety.145 
During the hearing, representatives from the school district, the bus company and the bus 
drivers union debated the need and rationale for the implementation of GPS 
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technology.146 At the time, the school district utilized a two-day radio system along with 
an electronic system that kept track of each bus’s mileage and the time when it left and 
returned. Supervisory road audits were used to monitor bus driver work performance. The 
school bus company representative present at the hearing articulated various reasons to 
justify the use of a GPS system: provide back-up information in emergency situations; 
keep tabs on bus arrivals and departures; monitor bus speeds; insure bus drivers’ 
adherence to set bus routes and provide guidance in following those routes.    
 
In response, union officials and rank and file bus drivers refuted these alleged 
purposes. The union president stated that the primary purpose for the bus company 
wanting the new technology was to be able to challenge the wage of each bus driver that 
is based on the specific amount of time they worked each day. He explained that the 
surveillance system would not enable the company to know the reason for a bus delay or 
the modification of a bus route. With respect to student safety, the primary reason given 
by City Councillors for supporting the resolution, various drivers told the Councillors that 
GPS technology could not provide data regarding which bus a student may be on or 
identify the specific location where a student exited. They emphasized that the best 
means of insuring that students get on the correct bus and off at the correct stop would be 
through personal supervision by a bus monitor.  Finally, the bus drivers explained that a 
GPS device, like a two-way radio system, is subject to interference and mechanical 
breakdown.  
 
Although locating students was the articulated central rationale behind the Boston 
GPS legislation, no one at the three hour City Council hearing mentioned using RFID 
technology as a means of keeping track of students like other school districts.147 A 
detached look at the articulated municipal need and the available technology should have 
led Boston officials to discuss the possible use of smart cards and RFID badges for 
students. The failure to consider the use of an RFID system for students suggests that 
student safety was the pretext for the proposed location scrutiny of Boston bus drivers. 
Alternatively, the lack of a discussion regarding the use of the alternative technology may 
be reflective of an uninformed and reactive approach to incorporating new technology in 
the workplace. 
 
Another example of the use of a pretext to justify the installation of tracking 
technology was presented during a 2005 disciplinary arbitration when a small marketing 
company offered GPS data to justify an employee’s termination.148 In December 2003, 
the company secretly installed GPS devices in all of its company’s vehicles. During the 
arbitration, the company contended that the reason for installing the tracking technology 
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was to enable supervisors to know where to contact employees by telephone. The 
company claimed that the secret tracking technology would increase productivity over 
the prior practice of using cell phones or calling work locations.149 The illogic of the 
company’s rationale is self-evident. The secrecy connected with the installation showed 
that the GPS device was never intended to be a means of communication between 
supervisors and employees. Even with the availability of the device, supervisors still had 
to call employees on their cell phones or at the worksites.  
 
A far more colorable explanation for the company’s decision to begin using the 
tracking technology was an incident six months earlier when the company’s owner 
discovered that a twenty-year employee, who was the subject of the arbitration, was 
missing at a worksite. Subsequent GPS data along with visual verification demonstrated 
to the company that the same employee was at home when he was supposed to be 
working in the field.   
 
The breadth and secrecy of the company’s implementation of tracking technology 
backfired.  Although the arbitrator concluded that the employee was guilty of serious 
misconduct, the arbitrator vacated the termination and imposed a sixty-day suspension 
based on the company’s failure to disclose to its workforce the installation and purpose of 
the GPS system.150 
A much more targeted approach to the use of GPS technology was utilized by a 
Missouri bottling company seeking to investigate cash shortages from vending machines 
in a particular service area.151 Rather than over reacting by installing GPS devices in all 
company vehicles, the employer placed monitoring devices only in vehicles used by 
employees with access to the specific machines with reported shortfalls. After the 
employee was cleared of wrongdoing, he received notification that during the 
investigation he had been tracked with GPS technology.152 
The use of pretext and secrecy regarding the use of tracking technology is aimed 
at avoiding employee opposition.  Based on the power of the tracking devices, it is not 
surprising that it has resulted in employee protests and demonstrations against what is 
perceived to be a substantial intrusion into employee privacy. In Massachusetts, both 
snowplow operators and bus drivers have engaged in collective action at legislative 
hearings to challenge the use of human tracking.153 Employees are not the only people 
protesting against the implementation of tracking devices.  Parent protests in a school 
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district in Sutter County, California, resulted in the district withdrawing its plan to 
implement RFID monitoring for its students.154 
In addition to overt protests, human tracking can lead directly to demoralization, 
hostility and lower productivity among the most dedicated and motivated of 
employees.155 Under real-time scrutiny, employees feel dehumanized and fear being 
disciplined based on inaccurate electronic data or employers misconstruing the data.156 
For example, after an ABC television station affiliate installed GPS tracking devices on 
the station’s mobile trucks, an unnamed on-air reporter was quoted by New York 
Magazine as stating: “Let’s just say people are pretty pissed off…We were never really 
consulted, and the whole Big Brother aspect has us uncomfortable.”157 The sense of anger 
and fear articulated by this television reporter underscores the demoralizing impact 
caused by electronic tracking in the workplace.  
 
At present, employees have few legal rights against the implementation or use of 
tracking technology by their employers while performing work duties.158 The scope of 
recognized employee freedoms while at work in the United States is quite limited.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed “[o]rdinarily, an employee consents to 
significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where necessary for his employment, 
and few are free to come and go as they please during working hours.”159 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in State v. Meredith160 is indicative of 
the narrow judicial treatment of location privacy for employees. Sixteen years before, the 
same court had broadly interpreted the Oregon Constitution to prohibit the warrantless 
use by the police of a tracking transmitter attached to a car.161 In contrast, in State v. 
Meredith, the same court held that the use of the same type of electronic tracking device 
placed on the employer’s vehicle used by an employee to perform her job duties in a 
national forest did not require a warrant. In reaching its decision, the court found that the 
employee “did not have a protected privacy interest in keeping her location and work-
related activities concealed from the type of observation by her employer that the 
transmitter revealed.”162 
In O’Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court ruled that public employees have 
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in the workplace. 
 
154 Lucas, Students kept under surveillance at school, San Francisco Chronicle, February 10, 2005.  
155 Colker, Go Ahead, Just Try to Disappear, Los Angeles Times, December 27, 2004 (quoting 
management professor Lucas Introna regarding the discontent caused by employer location tracking.) 
156 Yung, 36 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 177-178; Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom 
In An Anxious Age, p. 51 (Random House 2004). 
157 Algar, Spywitness News, New York Magazine, October 24, 2005. 
158Kaupins and Minch, Legal and Ethical Implications of Employee Location Monitoring, 38th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Science (2005), p.2 (noting the lack of any laws in the United States 
limiting employee location monitoring) 
159 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, supra; see also, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 
(1984). 
160 337 Or. 299, 96 P.3d 342 (2004). 
161 State v. Campbell, 30 Ore. at 170, 172, 759 P.2d at 27, 30. 
162 337 Or. 299 at 307 96 P.3d at 346. 
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The Fourth Amendment is implicated only when workplace realities establish that the 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy through the use of doors, locks and 
personal passwords. The openness of an office to the public and other employees may 
result in an expectation of privacy being deemed unreasonable.163 
In 2001, a federal appellate court ruled that a state employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content contained in his workplace computer.164 In 
concluding that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the 
office computer, the appellate court noted that that the employee occupied a private office 
and maintained exclusive use of the computer, desk and filing cabinet. Even with the 
establishment of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the appeals court found that the 
search of the employee’s computer was reasonable because it was based on the 
employer’s reasonable suspicion that it would uncover evidence of employee 
misconduct.165 
The O’Connor v. Ortega legal standards will result in interesting future legal 
challenges to the use of human tracking devices in public employment.  For example, the 
Supreme Court’s Karo decision may form the basis for a successful challenge to a public 
employer utilizing certain RFID and other internal tracking technology that allows for 
location surveillance in private areas, such as employee bathrooms and break rooms, 
where employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Another important 
unresolved issue is whether the application of Knotts, Karo and O’Connor analyses will 
lead to Fourth Amendment or state constitutional limitations on government employers 
using GPS technology in laptops, cell phones and other devices that would permit 
monitoring of employee location and movement while in the home.    
 
In the private sector, the primary national law granting employees certain limited 
statutory workplace freedom, especially the right to organize, is the National Labor 
Relations Act.166 Under that law, employers are prohibited from engaging in surveillance 
of protected concerted conduct and are obligated to negotiate mandatory subjects of 
bargaining with a certified or recognized union regarding certain forms of employee 
surveillance.167 
The information provided by human tracking devices can be a very powerful tool 
in an employer’s effort to defeat a union organizing campaign. By having electronic 
access to the location of employees at all times, the employer can determine which 
employees have been meeting together during lunch hours and break time and/or which 
 
163 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
164 Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001); See also, United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676 
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F.3d 392 (4th Cir.2000) (public employer’s internet policy eliminated any reasonable expectation of 
privacy; United States v. Bailey, 272 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Neb.2003) (employee had no reasonable basis to 
believe activities on work computer were private based on screen notification). 
165 266 F.3d at 75. 
166 29 U.S.C 151, et seq. 
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employees have visited the union’s office.168 As a practical matter, however, it may be 
very difficult for a union or employee to establish that an employer’s alleged 
discriminatory conduct toward an employee was based on electronic tracking. 
 
In September 2005, a New York federal judge rejected a union’s effort to vacate 
an arbitrator’s decision that had found that the employer had a right, under the union 
contract, to install GPS technology in company owned vehicles.  The contract contained 
language granting the employer the right to continually upgrade technology it uses and 
specified certain electronic devices being utilized by employees. In 2002, the company 
decided to install the GPS technology in company vehicles driven by employees. 
Employees reacted strongly to the installation of the GPS devices and their union 
challenged the employer’s action through the contractual grievance procedure. The 
arbitrator concluded that the contract language granted the employer the right to upgrade 
the technology it utilized.  In rejecting the union’s effort to set aside the arbitrator’s 
decision, the federal court noted that the contract granted the employer expansive 
authority to update the technology it utilizes.169 
The National Labor Relation Board’s General Counsel has issued an advice 
memorandum on the question of whether a trucking company was legally obligated to 
negotiate with the Teamsters’ union prior to installing GPS technology in company 
vehicles.170 The memorandum concluded that the company did not have to negotiate with 
the union because it constituted a replacement of a prior communications system. Before 
the installation of the electronic system, the truck dispatcher utilized a two-way radio to 
communicate with drivers. Throughout the day, at specific set times, the drivers were 
required to use the radio to communicate with the dispatcher. In addition, log sheets had 
to be submitted by drivers at the end of their shift.  Although the new GPS technology 
provided the employer with substantially greater surveillance power and information than 
the prior two-way radio, including the ability to monitor break times, the General 
Counsel reached the conclusion that the GPS technology was equivalent to the radio 
system and did not constitute a significant change in employment. 
 
The six-year negotiated contract between the United Parcel Service and the 
Teamsters contains a clause limiting the ability of the employer to discipline employees 
based on data collected through the GPS device carried by its employees.  The contract 
states: 
 
“No employee shall be disciplined for exceeding personnel time based on  
data received from the DIAD/IVIS or other information technology.”171 
168 Kaupins and Minch, at p. 3 (electronic tracking would enable employers to more effectively monitor 
distribution of union materials in the workplace). Employer electronic tracking also has the potential of 
running afoul of state laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against employees for their off-duty 
activities. Yung, 36 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 192-194.   
169 Otis Elevator Company v. Local 1, supra. 
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Negotiated contractual provisions depriving employers of the ability to utilize 
location tracking information in discipline fits into what Jeffrey Rosen has labeled the 
“control-use model” of regulating new forms of technology surveillance.172 In light of the 
employer’s power over its employees during work time, a contractual provision limiting 
the use of human tracking in disciplinary cases is a regulatory victory for employees. It 
also undercuts a primary articulated purpose for using such technology, namely 
discovering and disciplining employees for misconduct. Nevertheless, this type of 
negotiated language has inherent weaknesses. It accepts employer electronic tracking 
during an employee’s personnel time and does not prohibit electronic surveillance after 
hours. The provision does not address the employer’s use of inaccurate information 
stemming from improper settings or malfunction and does not set any boundaries relating 
to the employer obtaining personal information about the employees’ non-work 
activities.173 
VI.    Potential Legal Solutions 
 
Prior to the establishment of potential legal solutions to human tracking 
technology, our society needs to conduct a measured and meaningful debate to reach a 
national or local consensus regarding the acceptable contours of privacy in the new 
technological age. Such discussions should be aimed at drawing a proper balance 
between liberty and security and individual rights and property rights. A reexamination of 
the reasonable expectation test should be explored during such a dialogue along with the 
issue of whether there is a societal consensus that exterior exposure should constitute the 
end of protected privacy.     
 
Reliance on public fears perpetuated by the mass media and marketing schemes 
aimed at responding to such fears is not a formula for the development of reasoned public 
policy.  Similarly, horrific acts perpetuated by the use of tracking devices should not be 
the only catalyst for modification of public policy regarding new technologies.  
 
Gary T. Marx’s suggestion that the use of new powerful surveillance tools may 
decrease or be modified if managers and corporate executives were equally subject to 
such surveillance remains untested.174 Jeffrey Rosen has rejected the notion that 
ubiquitous technological transparency constitutes an adequate or appropriate means of 
balancing liberty with security.175 Nevertheless, those advocating for the implementation 
of human tracking technology on others do not necessarily want to be subject to the same 
level of scrutiny. During the rare public debate in the Boston City Council regarding GPS 
technology in employment,  the chief shop steward for the union representing the school 
bus drivers asked Councillor Tobin how he would react if his manager or boss monitored 
his every move through GPS surveillance. Rather than providing a reflective answer 
 
172 Rosen, The Naked Crowd, p.199 
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175 Rosen, The Naked Crowd, pp.194-199. 
 
36
regarding his own subjective sense of personal autonomy, the Councillor responded 
angrily asserting that his constituents would be able to vote for or against him in the next 
election.  
 
The question of location transparency for public officials remains unexplored. In 
developing and considering remedial legislation, it may be beneficial for a public official 
to agree to subject him or herself to location tracking for a day or week. A well-
publicized experiment involving a public figure wearing a GPS device would lead to a 
greater understanding regarding the power of the technology as well as potential legal 
changes needed to protect individual privacy. There is precedent for such an experiment. 
Companies are promoting tracking implants through publicity surrounding individuals 
who have consented to human implant. Public exposure to the results of technological 
tracking would enhance the debate regarding the use of the technology.     
 
Based on the slow congressional response to the development of new 
technologies and the current political climate, it is unlikely that federal remedial 
legislation limiting human tracking technology will be enacted in the near future. It is 
possible that a well-publicized event caused by the abuse or misuse of tracking 
technology may result in rapid and reactive federal legislation. An alternative to emotive 
legislative responses to important privacy issues would be the establishment of a federal 
privacy commissioner or privacy commission, similar to governmental offices established 
in Canada and Australia, to study and analyze new technologies and provide Congress 
with suggested remedies. However, it is far more probable that a majority in the current 
Congress would want to defer to the marketplace for potential corrective action aimed at 
avoiding privacy intrusions. Such deferral would be based on the erroneous assumption 
that there is more profit to be made in protecting privacy than in collecting, using and 
distributing location information.  
 
Reliance on the federal judiciary to find constitutional protections against human 
tracking would be similarly misplaced. Based on the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, along with precedents such as Knotts, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will find 
that the use of newer and more powerful technologies to track public location and 
movement is subject to the Fourth Amendment. To the extent that new tracking 
technologies involve monitoring within the home, Karo and Kyllo suggest that Fourth 
Amendment standards would be applicable.  However, law enforcement and public 
employers deserve more than post-hoc federal guidance relating to the constitutional 
dangers connected with the use of portable tracking devices in cell phones and laptops 
that can lead to unlawful location monitoring within a home.  The computerized nature of 
GPS and cellular technology may result in the transition from constitutional public 
monitoring to unconstitutional surveillance within a home without real-time human 
supervision.  
 
Since the development of human tracking devices, state legislatures and courts 
have been far more responsive to the privacy implications of such technology. State 
legislative initiatives have been aimed at criminalizing certain use of tracking technology, 
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establishing judicial oversight over the police use of tracking devices and extending 
consumer protections against the use of such technology in rented vehicles.   
 
Based on the speed of technological change, states should consider legislative 
commissions or committees with the authority to study technological developments and 
to provide guidance regarding potential legislative responses to a particular technology. 
Such guidance is needed to determine whether current state laws restricting the use of 
electronic tracking devices should be amended to regulate human implants as well as 
tracking devices attached to personal objects other than vehicles. States also need to 
reexamine their common law or statutory privacy causes of action to determine whether 
and to what extent lawsuits for damages and injunctive relief should be permitted for 
unwanted electronic location surveillance in public or in the home. In addition, 
consideration needs to be given to amending current state law to include sanctions for the 
sale of location information to third parties. Finally, another means of checking the 
potential abuse of tracking technology would be subjecting tracking devices to state 
licensing regulation.   
 
The need for careful legislative deliberation is particularly urgent in the area of 
human implants where the adverse social consequences of such devises have not been 
examined. The use of human implants is ripe for abuse and constitutes the most likely 
technological means for imposing geoslavery. State regulatory schemes already exist 
regarding what are arguably more benign intrusions into the human body such as 
tattooing and body piercing. A prohibition or regulation regarding human implants should 
to be carefully examined to properly weigh the varying interests associated with the 
technology.  In determining whether to ban human implants an examination should take 
place regarding whether the availability of bracelets, cards and badges with encoded 
information meet the same identification needs as implants. In addition, the substantive 
distinction between information obtainable from identification-based RFID implants and 
location-based GPS implants needs to be explored in developing state public policy in 
this area. Finally, any state regulatory scheme permitting the use of human implants 
should require informed consent with respect to the nature of the implant, the risk of 
privacy intrusions associated with the implant and the means of removing the implant. 
 
In the area of employment, state legislative initiatives may include a complete ban 
on human implants, a mandate for informed employee consent prior to the 
implementation of human tracking, written notice to employees regarding the 
surveillance, limitations on the daily period when surveillance would be permissible, 
specific legal sanctions for employers who utilize the technology for unlawful 
discriminatory purposes or to intrude on personal privacy and/or a prohibition against 
employers sharing the electronic data with third parties. The need for state legislative 
action is particularly important based on the growing portability of tracking devices that 
enables an employer to monitor an employee while working or not working and within 
the employee’s own dwelling. Such initiatives should be considered after careful 
legislative examination of the technology and a determination regarding the scope of 
protected employee personal privacy during and after working hours. 
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To the extent that fear justifies imposing electronic tracking on children and 
infirm elderly parents, a state requirement for judicial intervention or licensing may be an 
appropriate response.  Courts already have been granted the power and jurisdiction to 
deal with children in need of supervision and mentally infirm individuals needing 
guardians. Placing a judicial or regulatory check on electronic tracking of children and 
the ill may provide a balanced means of permitting a technological response to rational or 
irrational fears while protecting personal privacy.   
 
In the absence or as an alternative to remedial legislation, some have advocated 
for “self-regulation” through industry-wide standards to protect against inappropriate 
intrusions into individual privacy.  For example, in the United Kingdom, an Industry 
Code of Practice was established in 2004 for location service providers utilizing cellular 
technology.  Although self-regulatory industry standards have some benefits, they lack 
necessary enforcement tools. Nevertheless, experiences connected with the development, 
implementation and application of industry standards may assist in the formulation of 
remedial legislation. Finally, another non-governmental means of protecting privacy 
against human tracking would modifications to the actual technology that would include 
an ability to turn the tracking device off and/or a signal, image or sound indicating that a 
tracking device.     
 
In conclusion, the explosive growth of human tracking technology in the past two 
decades calls for a deliberative reexamination of our society’s concepts of individual 
autonomy and the scope of protected privacy.  The best means of reaching a societal 
consensus is through sober examination, deliberations and debate with respect to the 
nature of new and developing technologies and the impact it has on our concepts of 
privacy.  Through such a dialogue, an appropriate legal framework can be established to 
insure a reasonable balance between conflicting interests associated with the technology. 
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